Epistemology

Heuristic Epistemology to Limit Divisiveness

Introduction

When contrary truths collide, adherence can potentially lead to divisiveness. To address this concern now Armstrong puts forward the Heuristic Epistemology. According to Oxford Dictionary Heuristic is a method of solving problems by finding practical ways of dealing with them, learning from past experience. In this article Armstrong suggests that this approach comprises of three symbiotic and heuristic modalities, namely, the triad of Apperception, Appraisal, and Appropriation, undergirded by the understanding that the notion of truth is a type of virtue.

Heuristic Epistemology

Heuristic Epistemology is formed by an integral relationship between epistemology and moral philosophy. Without moral philosophy there is no existence of epistemology. Heuristic Epistemology goal is to create an appetence for the pursuit of truth as a type of virtue. More specifically, the intent is to change the dynamics of dialogue and enquiry by instilling a desire for appropriation and thereby limit divisiveness.

            Every individual finds interest, value, truth and meaning in something and so divergence and divisiveness exist naturally with respect to related truth claims. People will even criticize those who do not share their ultimate good.

Apperception is a linchpin in the attempt to integrate moral philosophy and epistemology. It serves to calibrate the will and intellect towards authenticity.

Appraisal diverts the object of enquiry to the subject. It diverts from mechanical to dynamic. Truth cannot be computed. Appraisal approaches truth in a gestalt and holistic manner.

Appropriation is a process of moving from knowledge to knowing and creates a type of awareness that separates one’s beliefs from his or her identity. Heuristic Epistemology contends that the quest of truth does not end once certainty is attained. And on cannot say, ‘I possess truth’ for example ‘My religion is true.’ Appropriation is a response to the limitations and beliefs are in need of Appropriation. 

 The premise of Heuristic Epistemology is that the subject of truth is far more nuanced than what is commonly cited in the literature of epistemology. Truth is foremost a moral quest. Sometimes truth requires more of the knower than discursive reasoning. The idea of integrating moral philosophy and epistemology begins here not only from the moral judgments but also those judgments that pertain to issues of truth.

Desire for Truth

Enquiry or adherence is not always authentic Heuristic Epistemology is an approach to epistemology. Truth is independent of any world view. It acts, as a aid in the process of enquiry with a desire to know veraciously, paves the way to move from error/ignorance to truth and at the same time it limits divisiveness and conflict.

The author also quotes Unamuno and says, “For Miguel Unamuno, a philosopher is one who philosophizes not with the reason alone, but with the will also.” again he quotes and states “epistemology will not bring us any closer in ‘attaining’ wisdom because too much emphasis is placed on the intellect’s ability (reason) without due consideration of the role of will. It is the will that has the final word.” Aquinas also says, “Will wills the intellect to understand.” By quoting these entire things the author says that the will also plays a significant part. If the heart does not have a will, then the eyes will not see anything. Heuristic Epistemology seeks to understand the relation between the will and the intellect and its effects in epistemology.

Postulates of Heuristic Epistemology

            By placing greater emphasis on the knower and not just the object of truth Heuristic Epistemology finds a more robust approach to truth. Knower knows through the four modes of knowing (enquiry, deliberation, assent/dissent, adherence), and the will also play an equally important role as the intellect.

Few Basic Postulates of Heuristic Epistemology

        i.            Truth is a type of virtue.

      ii.            Enquiry cannot begin until apperception is sought.

    iii.            For enquiry to be authentic, for the purpose of ‘attaining’ truth, it must not merely be pursued as a means to an end. pursuit of truth is an ongoing dynamic process requiring appropriation.

    iv.            Moral philosophy and epistemology is to be integrated.

      v.            The pursuit of a particular truth does not end with assent or certainty. What is further required is appropriation guided by apperception and appraisal.

    vi.            Enquiry and deliberation constitute a continual process of appraisal that requires apperception.

  vii.            Appropriation supersedes the demand for certainty.

viii.            Truth is a property of Judgment (via the intellect and the will). This does not mean that Heuristic Epistemology precludes the need for verification and justification but rather to say traditional approaches to epistemology are simply insufficient.

Heuristic Epistemology as an Approach

Some truth cannot be assented solely via ratiocination like statement, “I love you.”  This truth claim is not on the same level as saying “Your shirt is yellow.” The process of coming to the realization of whether these two statements are true or false requires different means. There is no single formula to know all the truth claims.

Heuristic Epistemology is being proffered because, what we think is true is what we will value. What we value is what we will live for. What we live for is what we will die for. What we’d die for is what we will fight for. Therefore, Truth is not about being right. Credence to the proposed triad creates space for authenticity, consequently, divergence is reduced, the causes of divisiveness sublimated, and road paved for truth to be more readily known. It is being suggested that Heuristic Epistemology could create a radical shift in how we think about truth, how we dialogue, and how conflict is resolved.

Reference

Armstrong, Malcolm C. C. “Heuristic Epistemology to Limit Divisiveness.” Journal of Dharma. 34, 02(April-June 2009), 207-220.